Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Fred H. Buhler v. Verl Stone : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Don R. Petersen; Howard, Lewis and Petersen; Attorneys for Appellant .
Arnold C. Roylance; Utah County Attorney; Jeril B. Wilson; Assistant County Attorney; Attorneys
for Defendants-Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Buhler v. Stone, No. 13715.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/872

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

w«rr aurwtWC COURT

DOCUMENT

KfU

RECEIVED
J.AW LIBRARY;

BRIEF

45.9
•S§

DOCKET N O L -

/2

*> JiT"G?

T- '~
< ~
J 4/J5
rL

0 £ C

5

l975

r

OF T H E

8K,G'AM YOUNG UNIVERSIT

STATE OF IJTAFJf ^£U^en *•'*"* ^aw School
FRED H. BUHLER,
^

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VERL STONE, Utah County Commissioner, MACK HOLLE Y, Utah County
Sheriff, and UTAH COUNTY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13715

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from Judgment of Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County
Honorable Allen B. Sorensom, Judge
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE
Utah County Attorney
JERIL B. WILSON
Assistant County Attorney
Utah County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
DON R. PETERSEN
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East Third North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
CMt

u r (_,
s

ri974

"*»"»"c«,rt"uZ

iJjsb
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
LORRAINE P R E S S
1397 SO<UTH MAIN S T R E E T
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
P H O N E 487-0651
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain errors.

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS PURPOSES COUNTY ORDINANCE
1970-1 PROVIDES AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING BY GIVING THE
PROPERTY OWNER NOTICE AND TIME
IN WHICH TO CHALLENGE COUNTY ACTION
POINT II. BECAUSE ORDINANCE 1970-1 DOES
NOT INTERFERE WITH FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS, AND BECAUSE THE CONCEPTS EXPRESSED ARE DIFFICULT TO
EXPRESS MORE CLEARLY, THE CERTAINTY OF THE ORDINANCE SHOULD
BE UPHELD
POINT III. THE TERM "UNSIGHTLY" AS
USED IN ORDINANCE 1970-1 IS NOT AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETIC STANDARD — NOR IS ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ORDINANCE BASED SOLELY ON AESTHETIC CONSIDERATION
CONCLUSION

1
1
2
2
3

3

10

14
19

STATUTES CLTED

Utah County Ordinances, Section 3-13-11
Utah County Ordinances, Section 3-13-2

4,9
13,16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
Utah County Ordinances, Section 3-13-3

13,16

Utah Code Annotated, Section 3-46-9

9

Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46-3 (1) & (4) .... 10
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B

10

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65A (1972)

10

CASES CITED

Am. Jur. 2d at 569

15

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971)

5

Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 99 N. W. 2d 156

7

Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 441
P. 2d 281, (1968)
12
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385,
46 S. Ct. 126
11
Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N. Y. 2d 263, 225 N. E. 2d
749 (1967)
17
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972)

8

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 92 S. Ct.
2294
10
McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 7 revised
(1968)

6

Mitchel v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct., 40 L. Ed. 2d
406 (1974)

8

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U. S. 306
(1950)

5

Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P. 2d 255
(1965)
17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1880)
State v. Cole, 18 Ariz. App. 237, 501 P. 2d 413 (1972)
State v. Diamond, Inc., 429 P. 2d 825
Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Com'rs
of L. A., 101 Cal. Rptr. 789, 496 P. 2d 840 (1972)
Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio 654,
148 N. S. 842 (1925)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
11
18
12
15

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
FRED H. BUHLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VERL STONE, Utah County Commissioner, MACK HOLLEY, Utah County
Sheriff, and UTAH COUNTY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13715

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OR THE CASE
This is an action to determine the constitutionality
of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1, relating to the inspection and cleaning of real property, and also, seeking a
preliminary injunction enjoining Utah County from enforcing said ordinance.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court held that the ordinance is an
exercise of the police power, that due process does not
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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require judicial process, the ordinance is not vague or
uncertain, and dissolved the preliminary injunction and
dismissed the complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek the affirmance of the District Court
decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Fred L. Buhler, resides in Highland,
Utah. Mr. Buhler has accumulated in excess of 261 vehicles on his property and in close proximity to his home.
These vehicles consist mostly of automobiles with several
trucks, and one or two snowmobiles. There was some
question raised at the trial as to whether or not the plaintiff, Mr. Buhler, knew how many of the vehicles were in
ninning condition, however, Mr. Buhler agreed that it
would be a fair statement to say ninety per cent of the
vehicles are not running at the present time. Of the total
number of vehicles, five of them are currently registered
and inspected. Titles to many of the vehicles are either
lost or otherwise unavailable and many of the titles that
the plaintiff has are not in his name but still in the name
of the person from whom he received the vehicle.
These vehicles stored in open view on the plaintiff's
property is a violation of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1.
Therefore, a letter was sent from the Commission on
March 6, 1973, informing Mr. Buhler the problem had
to be corrected within 30 days. As a result of that letter,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a meeting was scheduled with the plaintiff, Mr. Buhler,
and members of the County Commission and members
of the County Attorney's Office on April 26, 1973. Then,
under the date of May 8, 1973, a letter was sent to the
plaintiff from the Commission confirming that the plaintiff had until June 25, 1973. This extension in time for
plaintiff to comply was given to him so as not to interefere
in any way with his fanning operation and spring planting. On July 6, 1973, a letter was sent to the plaintiff
stating that he must remove his personal items from the
cars so that the County would be able to come in and
clean up the property.
The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order
on July 13, 1973, and the County was prevented from
any clean-up operation of the plaintiff's vehicles.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
PURPOSES COUNTY ORDINANCE 1970-1
PROVIDES AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY
FOR A HEARING BY GIVING THE PROPERTY OWNER NOTICE AND TIME IN
WHICH TO CHALLENGE COUNTY ACTION.
Basic to the due process requirements of the constitution is the idea that the state should not be allowed
to arbitrarily deny a citizen of his rights, property, or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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possessions. It has been presumed by the courts that
providing the property owner notice of pending action
against his property and allowing him an opportunity to
protest that action under the supervision of the courts
assures the property owner of a fair chance to assert his
position and insures against arbitrary action by the state.
The ordinance in question provides these necessary safeguards, and therefore should be upheld.
The first requirement of due process is met by section
3-13-11 which in part reads:
Duty of the County Board of Health, Notice.
Upon a determination that a violation of the
provisions of Sections 2, 3, 6 and 9 of this
chapter exists, the County Board of Health
or the employee designated by the Board of
County Commissioners shall ascertain the
name of the owner and description of the
premises where the violation exists, and shall
serve notice in writing upon the owner or
occupant of such property, either personally
or by mailing notice, postage prepaid, addressed to the owner or occupant at the last
known post office address as disclosed by the
records of the County Assessor....
The notice required by Section 3-13-11 amply satisfied
due process requirements and is not challenged by the
appellant.
The Supreme Court in Springer v. United States,
102 U. S. 586, (1880), enunciated the second requirement
of due process:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I t is sufficient, where only property rights are
concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination, (emphasis added)
The Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339
U. S. 306 (1950), further declared:
The words of the due process clause . . . require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice
and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case. Id. at 313. (emphasis
added)

^

In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), the Court
indicated that the opposing factors which need to be
balanced in determining the appropriateness of a hearing
opportunity are (1) the value placed by society on the
interest involved and (2) the state's interest in judicial
economy. Id., at 374, 378. The Court held in the Boddie
case that an individual's right to a divorce proceeding
could not be denied, but stated:
Due process does not of course require that
the defendant in every civil case actually have
a hearing on the merits. Id. at 378. (emphasis
added)
In striking a balance where certain police powers are concerned, the property owner's need for a mandatory and
automatic hearing is outweighed by the state's interest
in avoiding meaningless and wasteful use of the courts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and the state's need for an efficient and unburdened
method of dealing with nuisances, health hazards, and
other matters of community welfare. To use up valuable
court time to review each and every county ordinance
violation without regard to the existence or sincerity of
an objection by the property owner is not the intent or
requirement of due process. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, vol. 7 revised (1968), discusses this matter in
the context of summary abatement action:
The power of municipalities to declare and
abate public nuisances and the right of summary action in the abatement exist at common
law under the police power. This remedy has
not been impaired by constitution, statute or
decision. On the contrary, statutes providing
for abatement of nuisances usually provide for
their summary abatement by public authorities
including municipal officials, in proper cases
and by proper proceedings. The theory of the
rule is that the requirement of preliminary formal legal proceedings in a judicial trial would
result in defeating the beneficial abjects sought
to be obtained. Such municipal power has not
been impaired by the constitution, for if the
property has in fact been used in violation of
the law, and is a public nuisance, the owner
has no cause of complaint. If not, the owner
has recourse to the courts. A municipality has
authority to summarily abate that which it has
declared to be public nuisance. Where the nuisance is physical and tangible, a statute may
direct its summary abatement by executive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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officials without intervention of judicial pro- ;^
ceedings, in cases analogous to those where the
remedy by summary abatement existed at common law . . . therefore, it may well be said that
laws authorizing summary abatement of pub- .
lie nuisances do not deprive one of liberty or
property without due process of law or a trial
by jury. In truth, formal legal proceedings and
trial by jury are neither necessary or appropriate in cases of this character . . . Id., Section
24.71
It is not fatal to ordinance 1970-1 that no hearing is explicity required. That the property owner has access to
adjudication in the event that he wishes to challenge the
applicability or validity of the ordinance is sufficient
opportunity to satisfy due process requirements.
In Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 99 N. W. 2d 156, the
Wisconsin Court stated:
The plaintiffs do not complain of any procedural lack of due process in the application
of the ordinance to their property It would be
most difficult to substantiate such a contention
in view of the adequate time extended to the
plaintiffs to remedy their violations, and the
opportunity to have had a hearing before the
commissioner on the merits if they had elected
to do so.
W e find no denial of due process in the threatened application of the enforcement procedures
of the ordinance to the plaintiffs or their property. Id. at 163.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Where certain state police powers are concerned, it is not
an actual hearing but rather the opportunity for a hearing which is required. A property owner is not denied
due process if he fails to take advantage of such an opportunity.
The appellants cite Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67
(1972), for the proposition that a statute ordinance must
provide for a hearing before the state may take private
property. Although the Fuentes doctrine has been substantially narrowed in Mitchel v. W. T. Grant Co., 94
S. Ct. 40, L. Ed. 2d 406 (1974), it is instructive to examine Fuentes to determine whether or not ordinance
1970-1 is inconsistent with the Court's holding in that
case. The Supreme Court struck down Florida and Pennsylvania Replevin Statutes for not providing an opportunity for the property owner (debtor) to challenge a writ
of replevin before deprivation of the property occurred.
These statutes permitted a private party (the creditor)
to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin by mere ex parte
application to a court clerk coupled with the posting of
a bond for doable the value of the item to be seized. No
notice to the debtor or proof of right of possession was
required. The Court characterized the problem as follows:
Thus at the same moment that the defendant
receives the complaint seeking repossession of
property through court action, the property is
seized from him. H e is provided no prior notice
and allowed no opportunity whatever to challenge the issuance of the writ. Id. at 75.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Because there was no time between notification of the
action and actual execution thereof, the debtor had no
opportunity to challenge the action before the property
was taken:
The court has traditionally insisted that whatever its form, opportunity for that hearing ,.
must be provided before the deprivation at
issue takes effect.1 Id. at 82.
Ordinance 1970-1 provides for the notice required by
Fuentes (as previously discussed) and forbids any action by the state within a flexible amount of time after
notice is served. Section 3-13-11 provides the opportunity
to remedy the violation:
Within such time as the County Board of
Health . . . may designate which shall be no
less than ten (10) days after the date of service of such notice.
Only after such time may the county (in accordance with
county ordinance Section 3-13-12) act to remove the
offensive property. Within such time the offending property owner has, as McQuillin puts it) recourse to the
courts. Specifically, Utah Code Annotated 3-46-9 allows
the property owner a judicial hearing in district court if
if he wishes to challenge the ordinance's "validity" or
"applicability" provided "it is alleged that the ordinance
1

(W. T. Grant Co., supra, does not require that the opportunity for
a hearing come before deprivation provided that the initial writ of
replevin is issued by a judge rather than a clerk.)
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or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs
or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights
ar privileges of the plaintiff". See U. C. A. 63-46-3, (1)
and (4), Available also to the plaintiff are the traditional remedies of extraordinary writ under Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 65B and the forms of injunctive relief
provided by rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(1972).
The respondent argues that the notice and time provided by Ordinance 1970-1 coupled with the remedies
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and State
statute give sufficient opportunity to challenge county
action so as to prevent arbitrary county action and satisfy
the demands of due process where the exercise of police
powers are involved.
POINT II.
BECAUSE ORDINANCE 1970-1 DOES NOT
INTERFERE WITH FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS, AND BECAUSE THE CONCEPTS
EXPRESSED ARE DIFFICULT TO EXPRESS MORE CLEARLY, THE CERTAINTY OF THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The use of language inevitably produces uncertainty
to some degree. "Condemned to the use of words; we can
never expect mathematical certainty from our language."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 92 S. Ct.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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2294. For the purposes of due process a general standard
of specificity has been proposed by the Supreme Court:
. . . a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of
law. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126.
Ironically, this test itself is less than crystal clear and,
as with any simplistic test, is not without qualification
in its applications. The respondent wishes to emphasize
two qualifications to the court.
FIRST. The court must take into consideration
the degree of specificity with which the concept in question can be expressed:
As indicated the test to be applied in determining whether the statute or ordinance is constitutionally vague is whether "men of common
intelligence" can readily understand its terms.
Superimposed upon this test, however, is the
admonitiation that courts, in determining the
degree of certainty required by due process
should take into consideration the legislative
body's difficulty in expressing particular concepts. State v. Cole, 18 Ariz. app. 237, 501
P.2d413 (1972). (emphasis added)
A state or county should not be prevented from discharging its responsibility to protect the health and general
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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welfare of the community solely because the nature of the
offensive activity is difficult to define or too varied to
allow specification.
SECOND. The court should determine whether the
"ordinance impinges upon the exercise of First Amendment activities." Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of
Police Com're of L. A., vOl Cal. Rptr. 798, 496 P. 2d 840
(1972). The California court in Burton v. Municipal
Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 441 P. 2d 281 (1968), struck
down as vague and over broad a motion picture licensing
statute which allowed the denial of a license to a theater
operator if "the operation would not comport with the
peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals and general welfare of the public". Four years later, the same
court upheld a licensing statute couched in identical terms
as sufficiently specific for matters not involving First
Amendment activities, Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board
of Police Com'rs, (supra). The court stated:
I t is apparent that the rule announced in Burton applies only to those situations in which
the operation of a licensing ordinance impinges
upon the exercise of First Amendment activities, rather than ordinary commercial enterprises. Id. at 844.
The court then noted:
I t must be kept in mind that there are an infinite variety of activities or conduct which
could result in potential or actual danger to
the "peace, health, safety, convenience, good
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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morals, and general welfare" of the public. A
municipality cannot resasonably be expected to
isolte and specify those precise activities or
conduct which are intended to be prescribed.
Id. at 845.
An examination of the two sections in question will reveal
the First Amendment activities are not impinged upon
or related to the offenses prohibited:
Section 3-13-2. Real property to be kept clean.
I t shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership, or legal entity owing or occupying any real property in the unincorporated area of Utah County to fail to control
the growth of injurious and noxious weeds on
such property or to fail to remove from such
property any such weeds or any refuse and any
unsightly or deleterious objects or structures
upon notice from Utah County as provided
in this chapter, (emphasis added)
Section 3-13-3. Control of unsightly wastes.
I t shall be unlawful for any person to cause
or permit junk, scrap metal, waste paper products, discarded building materials, or any unused, abandoned vehicle, vehicles, or abandoned
parts, machinery, or machinery parts, or other
waste materials to be in or upon any yard, lot,
or piece of property within unincorporated
area of this County or in or upon the parking
space, or sidewalk adjoining such yard, lot, or
piece of property within the unincorporated
area of this County, whenever said items shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be unsightly and in public view, (emphasis
added)
The county in trying to prevent the accumulation of
harmful and obnoxious refuse has used the terms "unsightly" and "deleterious" to describe the conditions which
it seeks to control. It is apparent that the nature of potential health hazards from accumulated debris can vary
greatly. To require specific descriptions for each possible
offensive condition would place an "unreasonable" burden
on the county and unnecessarily limit its capacity to promote the general welfare of the community. Thus because
Ordinance 1970-1 does not involve First Amendment rights
and because the county cannot practically phrase the
ordinance in more specific terms, the ordinance should
be upheld.
POINT III.
THE TERM "UNSIGHTLY" AS USED IN
ORDINANCE 1970-1 IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETIC STANDARD —
NOR IS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDINANCE BASED SOLELY ON AESTHETIC
CONSIDERATIONS.
The police powers given states, counties, and municipal corporations do not include the right to regulate matter of pure aesthetic such as sihape, size, and architecture
of a house; color, size, and variety of trees and shrubs,
etc., except as the health, safety, or general welfare of
the public may be affected. Appellant cites an early
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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formulation of this principle in Youngstown v. KahnBros.
Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio 654, 148 N. E. 842 (1925):
We are therefore remitted to the proposition
that the police power is based upon public
necessity, and that public health, morals, or
safety, and not merely aesthetic interest, must
be in danger in order to justify its use. (emphasis added)
Also cited by the appellant is 16 Am. Jur. 2d at 569, which
in part reads:
The state cannot limit or restrict the use which
a person may make of his property under the
guise of the police power, where the exercise
of such power woudd be warranted solely on
aesthetic considerations, (emphasis added)
Neither of these authorities stand for the proposition that
appearance cannot rationally or logically be related to
health and safety considerations. The ordinance in ques
tion is in fact a health measure. The introduction to this
ordinance reads:
An ordinance amending the three of the Revised Ordinances of Utah County, Utah, 1956,
relating to health and sanitation by adding
thereto a new chapter to be known as chapter
13 entitled "Inspection and Cleaning of Real
Property". See appendix Ordinance 1970-1
at 1.
The county has the right under the police powers granted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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it to require property owners to keep their property free
of waste, debris, and junk which could pose a health
or safety hazard to the public. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros.
Bldg. Co., (supra). It is obvious that such is the purpose
of the sections in question:
Section 3-13-2. Real property to be kept clean.
I t shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership, or legal entity owning or
occupying any real property in the unincorporated area of Utah County to fail to control
the growth of injurious and noxious weeds on
such property or to fail to remove from such
property any such weeds or any refuse and any
unsightly or deleterious objects or structures
upon notice from Utah County as provided
in this Chapter.
Section 3-13-3. Control of unsightly wastes.
I t shall be unlawful for any person to cause
or permit junk, scrap metal, waste paper products, discarded building materials, or any
unused, abandoned vehicle, vehicles, or abandoned parts, machinery, or machinery parts, or
other waste materials to be in or upon any yard,
lot or piece of property within the unincorporated area of this County or in or upon the
parking spect, or sidewalk adjoining such yard,
lot, or piece of property within the unincorporated area of this County, whenever said
items shall be unsightly and in public view.
In the above sections, the county has used "unsightly"
as a threshold test. When junk, waste, scrap metal, etc.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
accumulate to the point of being offensive to the eye,
it becomes a concern to the county as a health and safety
hazard. It cannot be said that the county is exercising
its power to protect only an aesthetic interest when it
used the point of "unsightliness"; a benchmark by which
to evaluate the extent of an accumulation of refuse.
In addition, the respondent takes issue with the idea
that aesthetics alone cannot constitute a sufficient public
interest to fall within the police powers of a state, county
or city. Where unsightliness is aggravated enough to have
a material effect on the community the county or city
should be able to exercise its powers in the public interest.
In Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N. Y. 2d 263, 225 N. E. 2d 749
(1967), the New York court upheld the constitutionality
of town zoning ordinance which regulated signs and blueboards. The court stated:
. . . Advertising signs and billboards, if misplaced, often are egregious examples of ugliness, distraction, and deterioration. They are
just as much subject to reasonable controls,
including prohibition, as enterprises which
emit offensive noises, odors, or debris. The
eye is entitled to as much recongnition as the
other senses, but, of course, the offense to the
eye must be substantial and be deemed to have
material effect on the community or district
pattern
(p. 755.)
The Oregon Court in Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35,
400 P. 2d 255 (1965), stated:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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W e join in the view "that aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an exercise of the
police power." (p. 49, 400 P.2d p. 262.)
The court in Oregon City v. Hartle, (supra), held that
an ordinance prohibiting the establishment of auto wrecking yards in Oregon City was a valid exercise of police
power:
. . . there is a growing judicial recognition of
the power of city to impose zoning restriction
which can be justified solely upon the ground
that they will tend to prevent or minimize discordant and unsightly surroundings. This
change in attitude is a reflection of the refinement of our tastes and the growing appreciation of cultural values in a maturing society.
The change may be ascribed more directly to
the judicial expansion of the police power to
include within the concept of "general welfare"
the enhancement of the citizen's cultural life,
(pp. 46-47, 400 P.2d p. 261.)
In State v. Diamond, Inc., 429 P. 2d 825, the Hawaii
Court upheld a billboard ordinance stating:
W e hold that the application of the ordinance
to appellants constituted a regulation for the
public welfore under the City's police power
in a legitimate field for legitimate aesthetic
reasons and that it does not constitute a taking
of private property without the payment of
compensation. Cromwell v. Ferrier, supra, 19
N.Y. 2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749 (New York
1967).
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Auto graveyards, junkyards, and refuse ridden lots and
the like are eyesores and visual nuisances at the most
offensive kind. The proliferation of such should be prevented. Whether for health and safety reasons or compelling aesthetic reasons, it is in the interest and for the
general welfare of the community to control "unsightly
waste". Therefore the county's use of the term "unsight
ly" is not unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Utah County government is charged with the responsibility of protecting the interests of county residents and
looking out for their general welfare. Health and safety
concerns are a large portion of that responsibility. Because of the sometimes exigent nature of health and
safety hazards, the county ordinance governing procedures in these areas must allow for quick and efficient
action over a broad spectrum of situations. At the same
time the rights of individual property owners must be
safeguarded by those same procedures. To accomplish
both o fthese goals, the legal formality of such procedures
must be kept at a minimum. County Ordinance 1970-1
has effectively accomplished this by giving the property
owner timely notice of pending county action while, by
its wording, allowing the county a broad enough latitude
to deal with any situation which the Board of Health or
its agents may consider offensive. In thus providing,
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ordinance 1970-1 comports with basic notions of justice
and fair play and should be upheld as complying with due
process requirements.
Respectfully submitted,
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE
Utah County Attorney
JERIL B. WILSON
Assistant County Attorney
Utah County Building
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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